By General Monzer El Ayoubi
Translation: Dr Pierre A. Sarkis
The Ukrainian-Russian crisis is too big to be determined in causes and results in one or more articles, whether when sailing in the midst of shared history or assessing the constant geographic positioning, but the content of the following lines is a point of view which is not boring, but subject to being read, even in haste.
First, it seems that the scenario of the Russian Army’s large-scale military operation in Ukraine has not yet failed, but the execution steps are gradually moving away from the scheduled timing and dates, i.e. extending the timeline for the achievement of tactical tasks, for example: opening gaps or corridors and breach Ukrainian defenses; approaching the march with the enemy; occupying or overwhelming and assaulting certain areas; and a clear delay in the hierarchical aims of the list of targets outlined in advance.
Next, the commitment of the attacking forces to the schedule is considered a key item, but several factors may cause delays and slow implementation, such as: the length of the logistics supply lines; the defense capability of the enemy “block effect”; the collapse of the command, control and communications system (C3); the inaccuracy of reconnaissance information “Area of Intelligence Interest” compared to reality on the theater; the poor coordination between combat units and other types of weapons, such as, aviation, navy, etc.
Alternatively, and regardless of observer analysis in reading battle updates and defensive positioning maps or offensive deployment, the time-frame failure is dangerous for it can drain the forces through attrition, while hindering counter-mobility, and may weaken the structure and the order of combat forces, turning blitzkrieg into a quest for maintaining balance on the supposed disengagement line. There is no doubt that the scenario of operations inevitably observes this and President Putin is a pragmatic combination of political art, military efficiency and intelligence brilliance. It is natural for him not to enter a theater before he secures the appropriate exit routes when necessary, but he is certainly among the type of leaders who believe in the doctrine of “half a victory equals defeat”, and therefore, he will insist on achieving his goals in preserving the Russian vital range, check NATO bullying and ending the Ukrainian rebellion.
In contrast, Ukrainian President Vlodomir Zelinsky believes the resilient hold-out in facing the first waves of invasion was almost a victory, as he would assure Western nations that abandoning his country would be a strategic mistake, confronting his Russian counterpart with the same stubbornness and determination. The Ukrainian military command also considers that paralyzing or delaying Russia’s ground incursion and countering air superiority, whether with anti-armor missiles or those assigned to air defense, may allow NATO command to be drawn into military intervention, so that the battlefield is defined by the scale of the angles of an all-out war. On the other hand, in a succession of political positions, it seems that the US and its European and Western allies are trying to apply the military doctrine of the Russian Army, namely “carpet bombing”, using absolute punitive sanctions aimed at the Russian economic, financial, banking and investment fields.
In the same context, there are many details of the size of the strategic and theater readings, and noting it may be impossible in the heat of the confrontation. In principle, everyone will pay the price as there will be no winner or loser. Volatile days separate from point zero where guidance occurs through picking up, so the delegations sit at the negotiating table using a frequency protected from distortion if fatigue settles and good intentions notwithstanding.
Next, in lethargy there is laziness that may become poisonous with folly, imposing caution against drowsiness or numbness, where the alienation of the mind coincides with the lethargy of the body. In inertia, there is a noted parity physically, and the resistance or weakness of the still body of the Ukrainian forces for movement has been demonstrated, and a constant speed for the last moving attacking Russian brigades. The attacking forces avoid “guerilla warfare”, and the defending forces in turn avoid “direct and open confrontation”; the common factor between the two is to shun the targeting of civilians while being further away from any collateral damage.
In the terms of the Russian operations order, tactical nuclear weapons, the “nuclear deterrent” with limited effectiveness, whether destructive or widespread because of the geographical area under the strike, are used in two cases:
1- The demolition of choking points.
2- The entry of NATO forces in the battle.
In parallel, the development and expansion of the Russian attack, in order to speed up its decisiveness, falls within the principle of “stepping up the forces” and on the subversive Ukrainian cells as well. It is clear that the US is taking advantage of the time factor and the slow conclusiveness by sending more missile systems and “deadly” weapons through its European allies.
Finally, the inevitable and certain end of the crisis will impose countless, but not exclusively costly consequences:
– The Ukraine with its current geography no longer exists and the Russian economic situation will become more difficult to the extent of financial collapse.
– The anti-war movement in Russia will escalate.
– Many of the republics of the former Soviet Union will be on the path of disintegration, such as, the Baltic States, Latvia, Estonia, etc.
– The latter will be the next Russian bear’s meal after digesting the current one.
– The global economy will be volatile (energy and food security).
– The European Union will remain in the eye of the storm for a long time in parallel with the harsh and unprecedented sanctions to be levied on Moscow.
– International relations will undergo fundamental changes both between Russia and influential regional countries “Turkey, the Zionist Entity, Arab countries, Iran, China”, and the countries of Western Europe and the countries seeking neutrality, or those who are reluctant to take sides with either camp.
– Last, but not least, matters will be contingent on their timing, taking into consideration the strength of the fluctuations and the volume of the expected ramifications.
Beirut, 27/02/2022
Scholar in Security and Strategic Affairs
